Introduction
There is a sizable literature on the social welfare cost of fully anticipated inflation for monetary models calibrated to the U.S. economy. The typical finding is that anticipated inflation does not have a quantitatively large impact on social welfare.
A representative agent would typically be willing to give up less than one percent of consumption in order to move from an economy with ten percent permanent inflation to one with no inflation. This quantitative assessment emerges from calibrations executed for various sample periods and with diverse types of models.
1 The literature has almost exclusively focused on the U.S., with few exceptions (e.g., the studies of Canada in Chiu and Molico, 2007b, and Serletis and Yavarib, 2004 ).
The present study takes a first step at filling this gap by using an existing methodology and an existing monetary model to quantify the welfare cost of anticipated inflation in twenty-three of the thirty countries belonging to the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). The framework adopted is the representative-agent model in Lagos and Wright (2005) , with sequential trade in two markets, the first of which displays random trade. We consider both price-taking 1 Investigations based on matching models of money, e.g., as in Lagos and Wright (2005) , Molico (2005) , Reed and Waller (2006) , Rocheteau and Wright (2006) , Aruoba, Waller and Wright (2007) , Chiu and Molico (2009a), and Boel and Camera (2009) , find quantitative results that are not very much different from those that emerge in alternative specifications of monetary economies; e.g., see Fischer (1981) , Cooley and Hansen (1989) , Dotsey and Ireland (1996) , Akyol (2004) , Barelli and Pessoa (2009) . An exception is the recent study in Wen (2009) , based on a store-of-value heterogeneous-agents monetary model, which finds significant costs from inflation. Welfare costs are also higher in matching models of money where prices are bargained, as in Lagos and Wright (2005) and Aruoba, Waller and Wright (2007). as well as bargaining. In the first market that opens up in each period trade and consumption opportunities are random, while in the second market trade and consumption opportunities are deterministic. In the model each country is a closed economy and fiat money is the only asset available to self-insure against idiosyncratic consumption risk. In stationary equilibrium inflation is pinned down by the rate of growth of the money supply, which is controlled by a central bank by means of lump-sum transfers.
The model is calibrated to every OECD economy for which sufficient quarterly data exists for a common sample period spanning two decades, from 1978 to 1998.
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For some countries the data available includes periods spanning roughly the last four decades. The benchmark calibration technique adopted is similar to that employed in Lagos and Wright (2005) , to facilitate comparisons with the findings in the original study. Alternative calibrations are also considered, partly drawing from Aruoba, Waller, and Wright (2007) .
The benchmark analysis is executed for a quarterly specification of the model where preferences are unit elastic in both markets. Two parameters, the trade friction characterizing market one and marginal utility in market two, are calibrated to match one target represented by inverse velocity data. In doing so, countries are assumed homogeneous in the way agents discount future utility and rank consumption bought on markets where trade is random. In a subsequent calibration, the market one trade parameter is fixed to a value common to all countries while two preferences parameters (one for each market) are calibrated to inverse velocity for each country.
Additional calibrations have been conducted to account for country-specific discount factors, different sample periods, and to match estimates of the interest elasticity of money demand and not only inverse velocity.
Five main results emerge from such an analysis. First, during the years 1978 − 1998, in the average OECD economy studied 10% inflation is worth less than 0.5% of consumption, given price taking behavior; only two countries exceed 1%. For the entire sample, the average welfare cost rises to about 0.5%, but only three countries are above 1%. Australia and Switzerland consistently display the highest welfare cost, even when the model is calibrated to different targets or different sample periods.
Overall, such an impact of inflation is in line with that typically reported in studies of the U.S. economy. When buyers and seller bargain-assuming equal bargaining power-the average welfare cost of inflation is much higher because an additional distortion is introduced; this is in line with the findings in Lagos and Wright (2005) , Aruoba, Waller, and Wright (2007) , Craig and Rocheteau (forthcoming).
Second, the welfare cost of inflation is heterogeneously distributed across the twenty three countries studied. With price taking, it ranges from less than 0.01% in Japan to 2.32% in Australia. With bargaining, it rises up to above 6%. Third, the model does not fit equally well the money demand data of each country and sometimes it fits very poorly. In the benchmark calibration, the trade friction parameterthe probability of trade in market one, where money must be exchanged to tradecannot be satisfactorily calibrated for some countries. In the economies for which this is the case, the fit of the theoretical money demand to the empirical money demand is poor. Fifth, the fit of the model does not generally improve when the trading parameter is fixed to a value common to all countries (which minimizes trade frictions), using money demand data to identify two preferences' parameters, one for each market.
Using the full sample available (i.e., considering uncommon samples) does increase the welfare cost of inflation on average by 0.2% points, and improve the fit on average.
Considering subsamples of the common sample period or subsamples of the full sample period does not lead to consistent improvements.
Given these findings, one could hypothesize that the heterogeneity in welfare cost of inflation stems from countries' differences in the shares of trade carried out with money, greater shares being associated to greater costs. In fact, even excluding economies where the model fits poorly the data, the welfare cost of inflation is positively associated to the calibrated values of the trade friction parameter. The welfare cost tends to be higher in economies where trade opportunities are less frequent. An interpretation is that with greater trade opportunities in the first market there is less of a chance that money sits idle, so the inflation tax has less of a bite. Agents hold more real balances and consume more, so their marginal valuation for consumption is less than in an economy with less frequent random trade opportunities (more frictions). A poorly fitting model tends to generate quantitatively smaller social costs of inflation, also.
These findings are fairly robust to analyses conducted by considering subsamples of the full sample periods, calibration targets or preference specifications. For example, with price taking, the average welfare cost remains below 1% when the model is calibrated to money demand data each spanning half of the common sample period, or subset of years before and after 1973. The ranking of countries, in terms of their welfare cost of inflation, does not vary much either. Of course, the calibrated parameters and the fit of the model to money demand data does vary from country to country with sample periods. Using all available data generally sup-8 ports a better fit. The quantitative results on welfare costs neither vary much when cross-country differences in rates of time preference are accounted for, nor when the model's parameters are calibrated to match two money demand targets, instead of one.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents the model. Section 3 studies stationary monetary equilibrium. Section 4 discusses data and calibration procedure, and reports the quantitative findings. Section 5 concludes.
The model
Consider the representative agent model in Lagos and Wright (2005) with two markets, denoted one and two. The key notation is as follows. The variables c ≥ 0 and q ≥ 0 denote individual consumption in markets one and two. Preferences in market two are U(q) − x where x denotes production. Preferences in market one are u(c) for a consumer and φ(y) is disutility from producing y goods. The functions u, φ and U are twice continuously differentiable, strictly increasing, with u < 0, φ ≥ 0, U < 0 and φ(0) = 0. Let α ∈ (0, 1] denote the probability of trading on market one, where buying or selling is equally probable, and β ∈ (0, 1) denote the discount factor.
In stationary equilibrium the gross rate of inflation equals the gross growth rate of the money supply, denoted π. Suppose buyers and sellers are matched in pairs in market one. Suppose also that every buyer and seller bargain on the price and quantity of goods to be delivered using a Nash bargaining protocol with threat points given by their continuation payoffs if no trade takes place. Let θ ∈ (0, 1] denote the buyer's bargaining power, and 1 − θ for the seller. In order to have well-defined continuation payoffs as threat points, assume u(0) = 0. It is well known that in this case consumption in market one satisfies the Euler equation
where i := π β − 1 denotes the net nominal interest rate. Also, we have defined (omitting the argument c from the functions φ, u and their derivatives)
and we have imposed market clearing y = c. For details see Lagos and Wright (2005, p. 469 equation (8), p. 470 equation (11), p. 474 equation (22)).
Expression (1) defines one equation in the unknown c, which can be determined (not always uniquely, if θ < 1) as a function of the model's parameters and the policy parameter i. Policy affects the return of money, the choice of real balances, and therefore market one consumption.
When θ = 1 the model is equivalent to one in which buyers and sellers are pricetakers. Here Φ (c) = φ (c), equilibrium consumption in market one satisfies the
and c is uniquely determined as a function of the model's parameters and the policy parameter i. It is clear that consumption is not the same under price taking and 10 bargaining. With bargaining (θ < 1) buyers who have less-than-full bargaining power will carry less money than in the price taking case (θ = 1), in order to avoid being "held up" by a seller. This is of course a distortion in addition to that generated by nonzero nominal interest rates. See Lagos and Wright (2005) .
Let c π denote equilibrium consumption given π. As usual, equilibrium ex-ante welfare is defined by (1 − β)V π , with
where q * is the unique solution to U (q) = 1.
The welfare cost of inflation for an agent is the percentage adjustment in consumption of both markets that leaves the agent indifferent between some inflation π > β and a lower rate z ≥ β. Given that consumption is adjusted by the proportion ∆ z (income, expenditure, and hours worked are unaltered), use (4) to define adjusted ex-ante welfareV z by
For a representative agent, the welfare cost of π instead of z inflation is the compen-
is indifferent between π, or z inflation with consumption reduced by ∆ z percent. The analysis that follows focuses on the welfare cost of 10 percent inflation as opposed to no inflation, unless otherwise specified. 3 Calibration of the model
In this section we discuss how the model is calibrated for the price taking case, i.e., θ = 1, as well as for the bargaining case, i.e., θ ∈ (0, 1). A quarterly model specification is used and standard functional forms are selected; e.g., see Aruoba, 3 The data set is an updated version of the data used in the recent inflation study in Wang and Wen (2007) . See details in the Appendix. For Denmark, Greece, Norway and the U.K. sufficient M1 data is not available so Currency or M0 is used. For Greece, Ireland and New Zealand sufficient quarterly data is unavailable so annual data is used. The countries considered are Australia (AU), Austria (AT), Belgium (BE), Canada (CA), Denmark (DK), Finland (FI), France (FR), Germany (DE), Greece (GR), Ireland (IE), Italy (IT), Japan (JP), Mexico (MX), Netherlands (NL), New Zealand (NZ), Norway (NO), Portugal (PT), Spain (ES), South Korea (SK), Sweden (SE), Switzerland (CH), United Kingdom (UK), United States (US). The data for GR, IE and NZ are annual. The following countries have been excluded for lack of sufficient data: Czech Republic, Hungary, Iceland, Luxembourg, Poland, Slovak Republic, and Turkey. Waller, and Wright (2007) , or Lagos and Wright (2005) . 5 In particular, let
, and let U (q) = A ln(q) so that q * = A. For each country, the vector of parameters to identify is (α, β, δ, a, b 0 , b 1 , A).
There are several possible ways to proceed in calibrating the model. For clarity, we start with a benchmark calibration that closely follows earlier calibrations in this same class of models. Then, we perform additional calibrations. In the additional analyses we vary the parameters to be calibrated, the number of targets, and the sample periods.
The benchmark calibration is as follows. We presume that agents in every country share the same preferences over current consumption and labor effort in market one, 
In addition, set 1 − a = 0.00001, so that u (c) ≈ c −1 , u (c) ≈ −c −2 , i.e., preferences are approximately unit elastic in both markets.
This calibration is chosen as a benchmark for several reasons. First, the parameterization of market one preferences facilitates comparisons with quantitative studies for the U.S. based on the same model, as the published studies often assume unit elastic preferences and linear disutility. Second, while δ could be calibrated to match labor elasticity measures, we could find data on labor elasticities only for a few countries. Third, calibrating δ and a to values different than one has the implication that markets one and two are intrinsically different, but these differences are unobservable in the data. Hence, remaining agnostic about possible differences in the two markets seems a good starting point. This being said, we have also carried out an analysis for an alternative calibration strategy that pins down country-specific pairs (a, A), while fixing the trade friction α = 1 in all countries.
The analysis is conducted under the conjecture that the rate of time preference is homogeneous across countries, setting β = 0.994 (quarterly) as in the U.S. We also calibrated the model to country-specific discount factors, obtained by subtracting the average CPI inflation rate π − 1 from the average short-term nominal interest rate i, where i is the average nominal annualized yield on a standardized money market 14 instrument. Table 1 reports the discount factor values that result from applying this procedure.
We next discuss what we match to pin down the desired parameters.
Under bargaining, the variable c can be expressed as a function of i using the Euler equation (1) (24)), the model implies the money demand function can be expressed as
where
Under price-taking, θ = 1, the Euler equation (3) 
Hence, for b 0 close to zero we can approximate the equilibrium c using a simple function of i and the model's parameters,
This implies a simple money demand expression
where c is defined in (7). Tables 2 through 7 to match inverse velocity L(i), we fixed the trade friction α = 1 in every country and pinned down a and A to match L(i), i.e., we allowed preferences to be countryspecific while minimizing trade frictions in each country. Second, we matched two parameters, either (α, A) or (a, A) to two different targets, interest elasticity of money demand and inverse velocity L(i)(more on this later).
Results
The main findings are reported in the next three subsections, starting with a discussion of the fit of the model to the data. Subsequently, we discuss the share of monetary trade implied by the model and the welfare cost of inflation. Unless otherwise noted, welfare cost of inflation measures refer to 10% inflation versus 0%. The tables report results for the Friedman rule, also.
The fit of the model to money demand data
The model does not fit equally well money demand data of every country studied.
Sometimes the model fails to fit or the fit is extremely poor. In the benchmark calibration, the model fails to fit when the trade friction parameter α cannot be satisfactorily calibrated. To see this, consider the fitted values α and A in Table 2 (shaded columns) referring to the common sample, price taking case (for bargaining see Table 3 , shaded columns). By definition α ≤ 1 and such a constraint binds for 12 countries in the common sample period (13 with bargaining). In these cases, As an additional way to judge the quality of fit of the model to the data, we report the R 2 statistic. Note that since the model is nonlinear R 2 can be negative and it is not an uncontroversial measure of fit. This being said, consider Table 2 . The correlation between α and R 2 is strongly negative in the common sample (−0.84).
In particular, when the constraint α ≤ 1 binds the R 2 statistic is never positive.
Twelve countries fit this pattern. These "poor fit" countries include all those for which Currency is used instead of M1 (Denmark, Greece, Norway and the U.K.).
In the eleven remaining countries, instead, the implied R 2 ranges from 0. The fit of the model to the data is poorest for several European countries and South Korea, and especially good for Japan and Mexico (Table 2 and Figures 1-23 ).
This result carries through to the bargaining case (Table 3 ).
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There are several possible reasons for the reported difference in how the model fits money demand data from different countries. First, the common sample period might not have enough data to obtain a good fit. For this reason, the model has been calibrated for the full sample periods reported in Table 1 . Consider the benchmark calibration, price-taking case ( Table 2) . The model's fit improves for many countries especially because the constraint α ≤ 1 binds in half as many cases, relative to the common sample. The countries for which the fit improves include for instance Greece and Ireland (for which only annual data is available) where α ≤ 1 does not bind in the full sample, but it also improves for Canada and the U.S. where α ≤ 1 never binds but α falls in the full sample period. Calibrating the bargaining economy to the full sample also generates a better fit, but the improvement is less marked than in the price-taking case (the model fails in 8 countries; see Table 3 ).
Second, it is possible that the fit in some countries is poor because money demand is unstable. For instance, see Figure 16 for Norway. For this reason, the price-taking model has been calibrated for subsets of the common sample (years 1978 − 88 and 1989 − 98), as well as for subsets of the entire sample, pre-1973, when available, and behaves erratically during the common sample period and interest elasticities are among the lowest, and really close to zero. 10 The correlation between R 2 in the two specifications (θ = 1 and θ = 0.5) is close to one. 11 All in all, this suggests that unstable money demand, perhaps due to policy breaks, may be part of the reason for the poor fit.
One way to solve this problem could be to modify the model in a manner similar to the study in Chiu and Molico (2007b), which achieves a remarkable fit for U.S. and Canada money demand data by including endogenous nonconvex participation costs in market two (but this reduces analytical tractability).
Finally, a poor fit may stem from the calibration method used. It may tend to assign too much weight to the trade parameter α, which in turn leads too often to a binding constraint α ≤ 1, hence a poor fit. To explore this issue further, two additional calibrations have been performed. 11 We have also done the following. For three countries one could readily identify policy breaks. In 1990 and 1991 New Zealand and Canada switched to an inflation targeting regime and the U.K. did that in 1992. Hence, we calibrated (benchmark calibration) the models for these countries with data post-1991 (for New Zealand and Canada) and post-1993 (for the UK). The results for Canada and New Zealand do not vary a whole lot, relative to the full sample, but they do change a lot for the U.K. because now the model does not fail. This suggests that policy breaks may matter, at least for some countries. The results are as follows. For Canada, (α, A) = (0.03, 1.53), R 2 = 0.62 and the welfare cost of 10% inflation is 0.37%. For New Zealand (α, A) = (0.03, 1.30), R 2 = 0.57 and the welfare cost of 10% inflation is 0.9%. For the U.K. (α, A) = (0.12, 6.37), R 2 = 0.56 and the welfare cost of 10% inflation is 0.07%. Table 4 (full sample; see Table 5 ).
The fit does not improve much. The reason is that the model implies a very large, unreasonable, risk aversion parameter a in those same countries where the model fails to fit with unit-elastic preferences. For the common sample, we obtain a > 100 in ten instances (South Korea and nine European countries); in that case R 2 is essentially zero. Also, the average R 2 does not increase relative to the benchmark calibration, on average. For the full sample the model fails in the same six European countries for which it failed in the benchmark calibration. Similar effects can be seen when θ = 0.5 (Table 3 ). This suggests that the model does not fail to fit simply due to the assumption of unit-elastic preferences.
Additional calibration 2: Instead of matching (α, A) to one target, we matched each parameter to a separate money demand target. We have first estimated the interest elasticity of money demand for each country for the full sample period (see Table 1 ). We have used this target to first identify the parameter α. Once this has been done, we have pinned down A to match inverse velocity L(i). This has been done for the full sample, given θ = 1. In this case, the theoretical interest elasticity of money demand is
.
= a for the preference specification selected. Hence,
. Using this last result in the Euler equation (3) gives us
an expression that depends only on i, a and α. Given a = 0.9999, the parameter α is obtained by matching the empirical elasticity of money demand (reported in Table   1 ) to the theoretical elasticity of money demand given the average nominal interest rate in the data. The parameter A is then chosen to minimize the distance between L(i) in the model and the data.
We report results for the full sample period in Table 5 (unshaded area). Two findings stand out. First, the calibrated parameters change sometimes significantly. For example, the value of α is smaller, on average, relative to the benchmark calibration.
The reason for this is that this technique identifies the two parameters separately.
So, we have that the constraint α ≤ 1 binds only for Japan (unlike with the earlier calibration technique), and the constraint α ≥ 0 now also binds sometimes (Ireland and Switzerland). Second, the fit worsens; the average R 2 coefficient is now close to First, when α is one of the calibrated parameters, then the share μ is generally small, unless the model fails to fit the data. To see this consider μ for the common sample period in Table 2 . The average value for all twenty three countries studied is 20%, which falls to 4.6% when excluding countries for which α ≤ 1 binds (poor fit countries). The share μ lies below 12% in those calibrated economies where the model fits reasonably well the data (where α < 1 and R 2 is positive); it is between 40 and 90 percent in the remaining economies. In addition, if we consider only countries where the model fits reasonably well the data, then there is a negative association between μ and how the model fits the money demand data. The qualitative results are similar under bargaining, when we calibrate the economies to the full sample period, or when the two parameters (α, A) are matched to two different targets from money demand data. We note that μ is on average higher under bargaining, and smaller when full sample periods are used.
Second, the share of output traded on market one is generally large when we fix α = 1 and calibrate (a, A). The average value of μ, even if excluding countries for which the model fails to fit the data, is above 30%. The reason is that A is often calibrated close to zero in this case, i.e., very little trade occurs in the second market (see for example Australia or Switzerland in Tables 4 and 5 ). Hence, the assumption of unit-elastic preferences and country-specific trade frictions has a definite effect on the model's implications regarding how much trade goes through which market. The model with unit-elastic preferences puts little weight on trade in market one. 
The welfare cost of inflation
This section focuses on quantitative findings for the benchmark analysis carried out for the common sample period 1978−1998 (Tables 2 and 3 ). It also reports results of analyses carried out for different sample periods (full sample, and subsets of common sample and full sample), country-specific discount factors, and for the different calibration techniques earlier discussed. Two findings stand out. In the average OECD economy studied, the welfare cost of fully anticipated inflation is a fraction of a percentage point of private consumption, if prices are not bargained. With bargaining, instead, the average welfare cost of inflation jumps up to more than 2%. Second, the welfare cost of inflation is heterogeneously distributed across the OECD economies 13 Note that, without further specializing the model, it is difficult to use aggregate payments data to match parameters or to assess whether this model predicts correctly usage patterns for payments systems. Supposing that, say, 10% is the share of output traded in market one in the calibrated model, then this does not imply that only 10% of transactions are executed by exchanging money, while the rest do not. The model does suggest that 10% of transactions require money, and the others do not but it does not rule out payment with money in market two. That is, as suggested by a referee, the model tells us what is precautionary money demand in the model. A way to resolve the issue is to specialize the model further to study payments systems as, for example, in the interesting model in Telyukova and Wright (2007). studied. These results are robust to the alternative specifications and calibrations discussed above. Support for these results comes from the following observations. Consider the benchmark calibration results reported in Table 2 for the case θ = 1.
In the average OECD economy studied, 10% inflation is worth less than half percent of consumption of a representative agent in both the common and full sample periods.
The average welfare cost across countries is 0.32% of private consumption in the common sample and 0.5% in the full sample (Table 2 ). In only two countries the welfare cost exceeds 1%. Switzerland and Australia, two countries for which the model exhibits a good fit to the data, in general, have welfare costs of 1.58% and 2.31%, respectively, in the common sample period. Japan is at the opposite end of the spectrum, with less than 0.01%. Overall, these findings are in line with the impact of inflation typically reported in studies of the U.S. economy; e.g., When the buyer's bargaining power is halved to θ = 0.5, the welfare cost of inflation increases more than four-fold, on average (Table 3) . Considering the common sample, for instance the welfare cost for Switzerland moves from 1.58% to 4.58% while for the U.S. goes from 0.13% to 1.42%. The ranking of countries, in terms of welfare costs, does not change much when θ drops from 1 to 0.5. The correlation between the welfare costs associated to the two calibrations, θ = 1 and θ = 0.5, is 0.78 (0.76 in the full sample). This correlation increases if we exclude countries where the fit is poor with θ = 1 and θ = 0.5. That is to say, a decrease in the buyer's bargaining power has similar magnifying effects on the welfare cost of inflation across the countries studied. This confirms earlier findings that distortions coming through the pricing mechanism can substantially augment the distortionary impact of inflation in the U.S. The average welfare cost of inflation does not change much when different periods are selected, country-specific rates of time preference are used or parameters are calibrated to match interest elasticity of money demand and inverse velocity. In particular, the average welfare cost of inflation remains around 0.3% when countryspecific discount factors are considered for the common sample (Table 4) , and when smaller common sample periods are considered (Table 6 ). However, the welfare costs are generally higher in the model calibrated to the full sample period instead of the common sample (Tables 2 and 3 (Table 7) . Considering only those countries for which the model's fit improves in the post-1973 sample, for example, the highest drop is from 1.02% to 0.47% (New Zealand), while the largest increase is from 1.07% to 2.95% (Australia).
There is substantial heterogeneity in welfare costs of inflation across countries for all sample periods considered. Consider Table 2 , common sample period. The welfare cost ranges from less than 0.01% for Japan to 2.32% for Australia, two countries for which the model fits particularly well the money demand data. In eight of the remaining countries the welfare costs of inflation is at or below 0.1% and only in one country it is above 1% (Switzerland). When the buyer's bargaining power falls to 0.5, the ranking of countries in terms of the welfare cost of inflation does not vary much, especially for those countries at the tails of the distribution (Table   3 ). The same holds when alternative calibration strategies are used (Tables 4-6 ).
In particular, Japan is at the low end while Australia and Switzerland are almost always at the highest end. Differences in welfare costs can be seen hinging on three factors. First, the average welfare cost is higher in countries where the theoretical money demand displays a better fit to the data (there is positive correlation between R 2 and the welfare cost of inflation). Second, the analysis reveals the existence of a negative association between the trade friction parameter α and the welfare cost of inflation (−0.55 in Table 2 , common sample, which increases to −0.46 when excluding countries where the constraint α ≤ 1 binds). Third, the risk aversion parameter a and the welfare cost of inflation are also negatively associated.
15 15 The welfare cost results do not change when the model is modified to account for small dif-
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Finally, the welfare cost of inflation increases nonlinearly as inflation increases. Table 8 reports results for the benchmark calibration of the common sample period, θ = 1 and θ = 0.5. The results demonstrate that the average welfare cost increases nonlinearly, from 0.33% at 10% inflation to 2.99% at 100% inflation in the pricetaking case, and from 2% to 11% in the bargaining case. This is in line with the finding in Chiu and Molico (2007b) , where the welfare cost is found to be a concave function of the inflation rate. For example considering the price-taking model in Table 8 , the welfare cost grows the least in high-welfare-cost countries such as Switzerland and Australia (from 1.58% to 5.57% and from 2.32% to 10.85 respectively), and the most in low-welfare-cost countries such as Denmark and Norway (from 0.01% to 0.3% and 0.02% to 0.46% respectively).
Final remarks
A monetary economy has been constructed as in Lagos and Wright (2005) , where ex-ante homogeneous agents hold money to insure against consumption risk. Using an existing methodology, the model has been calibrated to data for twenty-three OECD economies for the common sample period 1978 − 1998, as well as for longer, uncommon sample periods. The calibrated model has been used to quantify the welfare cost of anticipated inflation in each of those twenty-three economies.
ferences in the elasticity of labor supply between market one and market two. In the price-taking model, market one elasticity of labor supply with respect to the relative wage (which is p) is
The analysis shows that when buyers and sellers are price takers, the average welfare cost of 10% permanent inflation across all countries studied is less than 0.5% of private consumption, a result in line with previous studies on the U.S. Yet, the impact of inflation varies noticeably across the economies, going from less than 0.01%
for Japan, to 2.31% for Australia. With bargaining, the welfare cost of inflation is substantially higher. Assuming buyers and sellers have equal bargaining powers, the average welfare cost across countries is 2%, given the common sample period.
The analysis shows a negative correlation exists between trade frictions, measured by α, and the social burden of inflation. High-frictions economies, characterized by lower calibrated α values, tend to exhibit higher welfare costs of inflation, which suggests the consumption distortion generated by inflation is magnified by frictions in trade. The analysis also shows that countries with high calibrated α values are also those in which the fit to money demand data is poorer.
The analyses also raises questions. In particular, the analysis suggests that the model cannot generally fit money-demand data reasonably well for a number of OECD countries, especially more than half a dozen European economies. There are several possibilities for why this is so. It seems reasonable to exclude that the main reason for the poor fit hinges on countries' differences, because many of the economies studied are similar to the U.S., where the fit is not bad. However, it is possible that the model is not rich enough, for example firms and capital are miss- 
Elasticity of money demand
Consider a representative agent economy and focus on odd dates. The Euler equation
for the representative agent is
Using the implicit function theorem we have
Given c = m/p and market clearing c = y, the elasticity of money demand is
We have φ (y) = y δ−1 and y = c. So (10) is
. Substituting c from (7) one gets
For the case of bargaining one has simply to substitute Φ instead of φ in (10), where Φ is given in (2).
Data
The analysis has been conducted using the following data.
• Australia: Quarterly Data. Money Supply: M1 (SA) from OECD; interest rate: average rate on money market (IMF), Nominal GDP (SA) is from IMF.
Unit: Australian dollars.
• Austria: Quarterly data. Money Supply: M1 (NSA) is from OECD in Euros, interest rate is money market rate (IMF), Nominal GDP (NSA) is in Euros (IMF). Unit: Euros.
• Belgium: Quarterly data. Money Supply: M1 (NSA) from OECD; interest rate is Treasury paper rate (IMF), Nominal GDP (NSA) is in Euros (IMF).
Unit: Euros.
• Canada: Quarterly data. Money Supply: M1 (SA) from OECD; interest rate:
Treasury Bill rate (IMF), Nominal GDP (SA) is from IMF. Unit: Canadian dollar.
• Denmark: Quarterly data. Money Supply: Currency (NSA) from IMF; interest rate: call money rate (IMF), Nominal GDP (NSA) is from IMF. Unit: Kroner.
• Finland: Quarterly data. Money Supply: M1 (NSA) from OECD; interest rate: money market rate (IMF), Nominal GDP (NSA) is from IMF. Unit: Euros.
• France: Quarterly data. Money Supply: M1 (SA) from OECD; interest rate: call money rate (IMF), Nominal GDP (SA) is from IMF. Unit: Euros.
• Germany: Quarterly data. Money Supply: M1 (SA) from OECD; interest rate: call money rate (IMF), Nominal GDP (SA) is from IMF. Unit: Euros.
• Greece: Annual data. Money Supply: Currency (NSA) from IMF; interest rate:
Treasury bill rate (IMF), Nominal GDP (NSA) is from IMF. Unit: Euros.
• Ireland: Annual data. Money Supply: M1 (NSA) from OECD; interest rate: Government bond yield (IMF), Nominal GDP (NSA) is from IMF. Unit: Euros.
• Italy: Quarterly data. Money Supply: M1 from Bank of Italy; interest rate: money market rate (IMF), Nominal GDP (SA) is from IMF. Unit: Euros.
• Japan: Quarterly data. Money Supply: M1 (SA) from OECD; interest rate: call money rate (IMF), Nominal GDP (SA) is from IMF. Unit: Yen.
• Mexico: Quarterly data. Money Supply: M1 (SA) from OECD; interest rate:
Treasury bill rate (IMF), Nominal GDP (SA) is from IMF. Unit: Pesos.
• Netherlands: Quarterly data. Money Supply: M1 (NSA) from OECD; interest rate: call money rate (IMF), Nominal GDP (SA) is from IMF. Unit: Euros.
• New Zealand: Yearly Data. Money Supply: M1 (NSA) from OECD; interest rate: Government bond yield (IMF), Nominal GDP (SA) is from IMF. Unit: New Zealand dollars.
• Norway: Quarterly data. Money Supply: Currency (NSA) from IMF; interest rate: government bond yield (IMF), Nominal GDP (SA) is from IMF. Unit:
Kroner.
• Portugal: Quarterly data. Money Supply: M1 (NSA) from OECD; interest rate: government bond yield (IMF), Nominal GDP (NSA) is from IMF. Unit:
Euros.
• South Korea: Quarterly data. Money Supply: M1 (NSA) from OECD; interest rate: money market rate (IMF), Nominal GDP (NSA) is from IMF. Unit: Won.
• Spain: Quarterly data. Money Supply: M1 (NSA) from IMF; interest rate: call money rate (IMF), Nominal GDP (SA) is from IMF. Unit: Euros.
• Sweden: Quarterly data. Money Supply: M1 (NSA) from IMF; interest rate: 3 months discount notes rate (IMF), Nominal GDP (NSA) is from IMF. Unit:
Kronor.
• Switzerland: Quarterly data. Money Supply: M1 (NSA) from OECD; interest rate: government bond yield (IMF), Nominal GDP (SA) is from IMF. Unit:
Francs.
• United Kingdom: Quarterly data. Money Supply: M0 (NSA) from IMF; interest rate: Treasury bill rate (IMF), Nominal GDP (SA) is from IMF. Unit:
• United States: Quarterly data. Notes: the values for net nominal interest rates (i) and net inflation rates (-1) are in percentage points on a quarterly basis;  i is the estimated interest elasticity of money demand;  is the quarterly discount factor. The asterisk * identifies a country for which Currency or M0 was used as the money supply measure, instead of M1; 1978-1998 is the common sample period (for BE,FI,MX,SE the starting date is slightly different as indicated in the first column). Inflation is measured using CPI data with the exception of Germany, for which GDP deflator data was used. Data for GR, IE and NZ are annual. Table 2 -Common and full sample results (price-taking, unit elastic preferences)
Notes: welfare cost and  are in percentage points;  is output share traded on market 1, welfare costs are for 10% inflation relative to 0% inflation and the Friedman rule (FR). Notes: the values for welfare cost and  are in percentage points;  is output 1 market share, welfare costs are for 10% inflation relative to 0% inflation and the Friedman rule (FR). The analysis assumes equal bargaining power, =0.5, and unit-elastic preferences. The parameters (,A) are calibrated to match L(i). Notes: welfare cost and  are in percentage points;  is output share traded on market 1, welfare costs are for 10% inflation relative to 0% inflation and the Friedman rule (FR). We report >100 for calibrated a values that lie above that threshold. The last two columns (shaded) report welfare costs for the benchmark calibration in Table 2 with country-specific discount factors reported in Table 1 . Table 8 -Welfare costs for high inflation (common sample, unit elastic preferences)
Notes: The analysis assumes unit elastic preferences with  and A are calibrated to match L(i). The calibrated parameters and model's fit are reported in Table 2 for =1 and Table 3 for =0.5.
